In the last 7 years, Russia has seen deep changes in all spheres of political and economic life. Some new realities have appeared in Russian medicine as well. This paper tells the story of how these changes came about, what kind of unusal situation were created, and how these situation are recognized in professional and public debates.

The article discusses the challenges, benefits, and risks that, from a bioethical perspective, arise because of the the development of eHealth projects. The conceptual framework of the research is based on H. Jonas’ principles of the ethics of responsibility and B.G. Yudin’s anthropological ideas on human beings as agents who constantly change their own boundaries in the “zone of phase transitions.” The article focuses on the events taking place in the zone of phase transitions between humans and machines in eHealth. (...) It is shown that for innovative practices related to digitalization and datafication in medicine, it is needed to rethink central bioethical concepts of personal autonomy and informed consent. In particular, the concept of broad or open informed consent is discussed, which allows the idea of moral responsibility in the field of biomedical technologies to be extended to events of uncertain future. The authors draw attention to the problems associated with the emergence of new autonomous subjects/agents in relationship between doctors and patients. The humanization of machines occurring in eHealth is accompanied by a counter trend – the formation of conceptions and practices of the quantified self. There emerges the practices of self-care and bio-power caused by the datafication and digitization of personality. The authors conclude that bioethics should proactively develop norms for the evolving interaction between doctor and patients. (shrink)

Starting bioethics in Russia we were motivated with the idea of the democratization of our society on a basic micro-social level. The country was swift enough to take several important steps in this direction on the macro-social level, i.e., to adopt a new constitution with guarantees of human rights and rights of ownership of private property, to elect the parliament and the president. But these modernizations in the Russian political facade did not sufficiently change the internal structure of the society–the (...) net of everyday relationships in the home, at work, at school, in hospitals and other places. One of the most brilliant philosophers of the Russian “silver age,” L.S. Frank, wrote in the beginning of the century that a tyrannical state grows out of tyrannical interpersonal relationships. Political revolution not grounded in a social evolution on the basic level of satisfying “simple” human economic, physical, and psychological needs could reproduce only the same totalitarian pattern under a new ideological label. Events resulting from the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 proved the wisdom of his statement. Russia could suffer the same fate today. (shrink)

The Central and East European Association of Bioethics, CEEAB, was founded in the Hungarian city of Pecs, on 6 February 1999, at a meeting of scholars from Croatia, Hungry, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Russia. The meeting was supported by the Soros Foundation and the Albert Schweitzer Institute for the Humanities.

In the early 1990s, the primary problem in Russian bioethics was to gain the attention and recognition of the public and the medical establishment. Very few people were even familiar with the word “bioethics.” Within medical education, only a paternalistic and scholastic “medical deontology” was viewed as the professionally acceptable way to deal with the existing moral problems. The public was ignorant of the rights of patients and consumers of medical services. The usual way of resolving conflicts between patients and (...) physicians was to complain to medical authorities. Very few cases of disputes were brought to the courts. Representatives of religious groups did not participate in discussions involving dilemmas generated by progress in biomedical technologies, and they did not seek to influence legislation in this area. (shrink)

I graduated from, medical school in 1972. According to orders signed at the Kremlin by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I was obliged, along with every graduating medical student, to swear to a new professional code, “The Oath of the Soviet Physicians.” This was the second year the oath was used. Incorporated in the oath were promises to “conduct all my actions according to the principles of the Communist morality, to always keep in mind … the (...) high responsibility I have to my people and to the Soviet government” I felt no discomfort joining with my friends in repeating words about the communist morality which by that time had already become a ritualized and meaningless official decoration of our life. The text of this oath fit into the political and medical ideology of that time. Not surprisingly, “The Oath of the Soviet Physicians” died along with the Soviet Union. (shrink)

The healthcare system in the new Russia is in an agonizing flux of political, economic, and ideological turmoil. The individual in this system, comfortable with the long-established policies of the former Soviet system, is now confronted with instability, rapid change, and an uncertain future.

Studie má za cíl představit strukturu Hayekova evolucionismu. Argumentace postupuje v několika krocích: Východiskem je historicko- systematická expozice způsobu, jakým evoluční teorie ovlivnila Hayekovu filosofii, především s ohledem na periodizaci vývoje jeho myšlení a systematické odlišení explanans a explanandum v rámci jeho teorie vědy. Dále je rozebírán způsob, jakým Hayek rozvíjí svoji metodologii vědy. V této souvislosti je argumentováno ve prospěch teze, že Hayekovo pojetí metodologického dualismu je důsledkem ovlivnění evoluční teorií. Zároveň je evoluční teorie představena jako nástroj vysvětlení, konkrétně (...) pak tzv. vysvětlení vzorce. Následně je představeno Hayekovo pojetí společnosti v kontextu kulturní evoluce. Společnost je interpretována jako řád jednání a je kladen důraz na Hayekovo vnímání společnosti jako řádu vyvíjejícího se společně s lidskou myslí. Na základě těchto předpokladů je v poslední části rozvinuto Hayekovo pojetí mysli. Toto pojetí vychází z konekcionistické pozice. Dále argumentuji proti tradičnímu pohledu na Hayekovu filosofii jako rozvíjení Kantovy filosofie. Závěr rekapituluje základní body Hayekova evolucionismu. (shrink)

On the one hand, Pavel Tichý has shown in his Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) that the best way of explicating meaning of the expressions of a natural language consists in identification of meanings with abstract procedures. TIL explicates objective abstract procedures as so-called constructions. Constructions that do not contain free variables and are in a well-defined sense ´normalized´ are called concepts in TIL. On the second hand, Kolmogorov in (Mathematische Zeitschrift 35: 58–65, 1932) formulated a theory of problems, using (...) NL expressions. He explicitly avoids presenting a definition of problems. In the present paper an attempt at such a definition (explication)—independent of but in harmony with Medvedev´s explication—is given together with the claim that every concept defines a problem. The paper treats just mathematical concepts, and so mathematical problems, and tries to show that this view makes it possible to take into account some links between conceptual systems and the ways how to replace a noneffective formulation of a problem by an effective one. To show this in concreto a wellknown Kleene’s idea from his (Introduction to metamathematics. D. van Nostrand, New York, 1952) is exemplified and explained in terms of conceptual systems so that a threatening inconsistence is avoided. (shrink)

The canonical pair of a proof system P is the pair of disjoint NP sets where one set is the set of all satisfiable CNF formulas and the other is the set of CNF formulas that have P-proofs bounded by some polynomial. We give a combinatorial characterization of the canonical pairs of depth d Frege systems. Our characterization is based on certain games, introduced in this article, that are parametrized by a number k, also called the depth. We show that (...) the canonical pair of a depth d Frege system is polynomially equivalent to the pair (Ad+2,Bd+2) where Ad+2 (respectively, Bd+1) are depth d+1 games in which Player I (Player II) has a positional winning strategy. Although this characterization is stated in terms of games, we will show that these combinatorial structures can be viewed as generalizations of monotone Boolean circuits. In particular, depth 1 games are essentially monotone Boolean circuits. Thus we get a generalization of the monotone feasible interpolation for Resolution, which is a property that enables one to reduce the task of proving lower bounds on the size of refutations to lower bounds on the size of monotone Boolean circuits. However, we do not have a method yet for proving lower bounds on the size of depth d games for d>1. (shrink)

The first, easiest answer to the question "What do novels speak about?" is D. H. Lawrence's conviction that novels are about "man alive," as quoted at the beginning of Guido Mazzoni's recent book on the theory of the novel.1 In a slightly more explicit accounting, one could say that novels speak about human actions and passions. These answers are the first, because they are plausible and general. They are the easiest, because they state the obvious. And yet, precisely because they (...) are so obvious, such answers often tend to be overlooked in our search for better, more complete explanations.One can improve these answers by noting that, culturally and historically, the novel has been divided into older, therefore... (shrink)

The subject of the present inquiry is the approach-to-the-truth research, which started with the publication of Sir Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations. In the decade before this publication, Popper fiercely attacked the ideas of Rudolf Carnap about confirmation and induction; and ten years later, in the famous tenth chapter of Conjectures he introduced his own ideas about scientific progress and verisimilitude. Abhorring inductivism for its apprecia tion of logical weakness rather than strength, Popper tried to show that fallibilism could serve (...) the purpose of approach to the truth. To substantiate this idea he formalized the common sense intuition about preferences, that is: B is to be preferred to A if B has more advantages andfewer drawbacks than A. In 1974, however, David Millerand Pavel Tichy proved that Popper's formal explication could not be used to compare false theories. Subsequently, many researchers proposed alternatives or tried to improve Popper's original definition. (shrink)

En Occidente son bien conocidos los pensadores rusos de los siglos XIX y XX: Fiodor Doctoievski, Lev Tolstoj, Vladimir Soloviev, Pavel Florenskij, Nicolaj Berdaiev y otros. Pero si los especialistas estudian con profundidad y seriedad el pensamiento ruso literario y filosófico. Por otro lado, las tradiciones filosóficas que se han desarrollado en Rusia a lo largo de los siglos constituyen sin duda parte de la cultura nacional rusa, así como de la cultura europea y mundial. Este breve artículo persigue (...) dos metas: dar a conocer al lector español algunos jalones del desarrollo de la filosofía rusa en el contexto de la historia del pensamiento europeo, con especial atención a su papel en el campo de la educación, y describir la situación y el papel de la filosofía en la actual sociedad rusa. (shrink)

This article examines the philosophy of law of the eminent twentieth-century Russian philosopher of law, Pavel I. Novgorodtsev. I demonstrate that his viewpoints express a dialectic between the nat...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELLS ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE'S SENSE-REFERENCE DISTINCTION PAWEL TURNAu Philosophy I Jagiellonian University Cracow, Poland I n "On Denoting"l Russell argued that Frege's theory of sense and reference was an "inextricable tangle", but, ironically, many readers found the argument even more knotry. In an effort to make sense of it, commentators were often driven to attribute to Russell quite obvious and simple fallacies. A different approach was taken by Peter (...) Geach, who suggested that Russell's argument could be given a consistent reading if it were construed as arguing, not against Frege's theory, but against Russell's own earlier theory, which he put forward in The Principles of Mathematics. It is not an implausible hypothesis, considering how prone Russell was to misrepresent' other philosophers' views and read his own powerful ideas into their writings. In order to justifY Geach's hypothesis properly, one would have to show the crucial difference between Russell's and Frege's theories that made only one of them susceptible to the attack in "On Denoting ". Russell explicitly considered the two theories to be "very nearly the same"; this self-interpretation would have to be questioned. Geach's hypothesis would be further strengthened by providing an actual exegesis of the "On Denoting" argument as directed against The Principles ofMathematics theory. In this paper 1 will try to accomplish both of these tasks. Russell is often accused of confusing use and mention. The accusation is not fair, however. It is true that he does not insist on this distinction; he does not employ it extensively. But he is certainly Russell's Argument against Frege's Distinction 53 aware of it; he simply does not think that it is an important logical distinction. Today this view may seem almost incomprehensible, but that only shows the strength of Frege's influence on our ideas. There are two striking symptoms of Russell's lack of concern for the use-mention distinction: firstly, he does not observe the convention which says that putting an expression in quotation marks produces a name of that expression; secondly, he does not feel any need to employ the pair of terms "sentence" and "proposition", but contents himself with the latter only. The claim about Russell's use of inverted commas needs to be proved; I will come to that later. Russell's assertions are often ambiguous between use and mention of expressions. For example, he asserts that "propositions do not contain words" (PaM, p. 47). However, a few pages later, he speaks of propositions that contain the phrase "any number" (p. 53). If this is not to be self-contradictory, then either the term "proposition" must sometimes signifY a linguistic expression, or the term "phrase" must sometimes be understood without implying that a phrase consists of words. This ambiguity is openly admitted in a later article, where he writes: [we shall be concerned with] the distinction between verbs and substantives, or, more correctly, between the objects denoted by verbs and the objects denoted by substantives. Since this more correct expression is long and cumbrous, I shall generally use the shorter expression to mean the same thing. Thus, when I speak of verbs, I mean the object denoted by verbs, and similarly for substantives.2. Russell's attitude towards the distinction between use and mention is not unjustified. It has its reason in his view oflanguage and the subject -matter of logic. In Russell's view, the subject-matter of logic has nothing to do with language. Words, both spoken and written, are entirely outside its realm. Logic, just as other sciences (except linguistics ), is concerned with the entities indicated by words, and not with words themselves. Even the relation of indicating, which holds between words and things in the world, is of no interest to it: "mean1 In Lf(, pp. 39-56. russ.lI: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster Univecsity Library Press n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 51- 66 ISSN 0036-o16~ 2 B. Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 12 (r9II-12): 1-24; in Lf(, pp. 103-24 (at 107-8). 54 PAWEL TURNAU Russell's Argument... (shrink)

The article offers a rigorous truth condition for subjunctively conditional statements. The theory is framed in the system of transparent intensional logic and takes connections (especially the cause-Effect relation) as basic. Counterexamples are given to rival theories based on the notion of world similarity.

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so-called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model, assumes that parsing is non-deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. When (...) disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task-dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task-dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self-paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task-dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task-driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings. (shrink)

Chapter One: Constructions. Entities, constructions, and functions When one travels from Los Angeles to New York, going, say, by way of St. Louis, Chicago, ...

We prove an exponential lower bound on the length of cutting plane proofs. The proof uses an extension of a lower bound for monotone circuits to circuits which compute with real numbers and use nondecreasing functions as gates. The latter result is of independent interest, since, in particular, it implies an exponential lower bound for some arithmetic circuits.

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...) most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy. (shrink)

Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologians claim that the unique event of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary is present in Eucharistic liturgies. A popular explanatory strategy for this miraculous presence suggests that due to its supernatural character the Eucharist “conquers time,” transcends its boundaries, and allows for temporal coincidence of two chronologically distant events. I discuss the four main approaches within this strategy that can be discovered in contemporary theological writings. The first approach implies a time travel of the Calvary event. (...) The second suggests the time travel of Eucharistic participants. The third eliminates the chronological distance by relocating one of the events into a timeless reality. The fourth assumes multilocation of the event across time. I argue that each of these approaches is untenable on philosophical or theological grounds. (shrink)

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Motivated by the problem of finding finite versions of classical incompleteness theorems, we present some conjectures that go beyond NP ≠ coNP. These conjectures formally connect computational complexity with the difficulty of proving some sentences, which means that high computational complexity of a problem associated with a sentence implies that the sentence is not provable in a weak theory, or requires a long proof. Another reason for putting forward these conjectures is that some results in proof complexity seem to be (...) special cases of such general statements and we want to formalize and fully understand these statements. Roughly speaking, we are trying to connect syntactic complexity, by which we mean the complexity of sentences and strengths of the theories in which they are provable, with the semantic concept of complexity of the computational problems represented by these sentences. -/- We have introduced the most fundamental conjectures in our earlier works. Our aim in this article is to present them in a more systematic way, along with several new conjectures, and prove new connections between them and some other statements studied before. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the ‘centralized incoming and outgoing motions’ model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are self-movers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in Physics VIII. The CIOM model helps to elucidate (...) Aristotle’s two central yet problematic claims, namely that the soul is the efficient cause of animal motion and that it is the internal supporting-point necessary for animal motion. Moreover, the CIOM model helps us to explain the difference between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary motions, and to square Aristotle’s cardiocentrism with his hylomorphism, but also, more generally, it provides an interesting way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the causal structure of the world. (shrink)

2 Popper's Logical Definition of Verisimilitude. 3 Popper's Probabilistic Definition of Verisimilitude. 4 Conclusion.

Introduction. The article is focused on analyzing the aesthetic aspect of A. Kojève’s philosophy, the ability of his philosophy, from an aesthetic point of view, to clarify a number of key problems of the modern political and cultural environment. The purpose of the study is to determine the epistemological attitude of A. Kojève’s philosophy able to clarify the way in which his philosophy problematizes the current cultural and political reality. Methods. Hermeneutics, comparative analysis and deconstruction are used as research methods. (...) Comparative analysis allows us to demarcate A. Kojève’s own line of reasoning, in the context of aesthetic and epistemological theories, as well as Hegelian themes themselves. Hermeneutics is the central method in the work, since the philosophy of A. Kojeve requires interpretation as an aesthetic theory. Deconstruction, formalized to the status of a method according to P. de Man, allows us to detect inconsistencies, the principle of mutual problematization of Kojeve’s philosophy and the current political and epistemological agenda. Scientific novelty of the research. The standard way of interpreting the work of A. Kojève is to evaluate him as an interpreter of G. Hegel. The author analyzes some meaning of A. Kojève’s philosophy, separate from G. Hegel’s explanation of the text. The novelty lies not only in the fact that A. Kojève’s philosophy is defined as theorizing that goes beyond technical hermeneutics (clear presentation), but also as a specific representation of such theorizing as epistemological aesthetic theory. The latter is a rather rare interpretation of the philosophy of A. Kojeve. This allows us to expand the traditional assumption that post-Hegelian epistemesthetics is the property of an extremely limited number of authors (for example, B. Croce). Moreover, such an interpretation of A. Kojève’s theories is a new element in the emerging trend of considering political issues within the framework of epistemological aesthetics. Results. The specific mode of interpreting G. Hegel, which is carried out by A. Kojève, turns the philosophy of the former into a unique aesthetic project. In this project, the category of aesthetic experience comes to the foreground, indicating the empty, formal nature of any discourse. In this regard, any claim to knowledge of reality, to a correct idea of the subject is replaced by the idea of creating the subject of discourse. Consistent treatment of this idea is symptomatic of the philosophy of A. Kojève. This philosophy is a reflection of those historical changes that gave rise to the culture of “aesthetic rationality”: empty and formal. In A. Kojève’s philosophy, one can see how such a culture of the End of History is, contrary to Hegelian ideas, not the era of the struggle decline, but the era of its strange transformation, a symptom of increasing political violence. Conclusions. A. Kojève’s philosophy is considered not as a utopian political project, but as a problematization of the modern cultural and political sphere. The latter is understood as an indication of the inconsistency of ontological discourses of Truth, the discovery in the very essence of discursive practices of an empty, formal principle, and therefore primarily of interest to aesthetics. The modern era of the End of History and the end of the era of persuasive speech gives an idea of the main political paradox (at least for the philosophy of A. Kojève, and at most for the modern political environment). The era of disappointment in discourse should become an era of refusal to fight for discourses, but it becomes an era of maximizing violence, since it is in a situation of disappointment that discourses can only be supported by force. We move from unconvincing speech to convincing violence, but it is possible to understand the origins and specifics of this transition only by considering A. Kojève’s philosophy in the light of such a discipline as aesthetics. (shrink)

In this article I explore Maimon’s role in the evolution of Kant’s understanding of the function of the history of philosophy in philosophical enquiry. Kant is often viewed as holding an ambivalent...

The subject of the study is the socio-cultural threats to the information security of Russian citizens associated with ChatGPT technologies (Chat Generative Pre-trained Transformer, a machine-generated text response generator simulating a dialogue). The object of research − evaluation of the ratio of advantages and threats of generative language models based on "machine learning" in modern (2021-2023) scientific literature (journals HAC K1, K2 and Scopus Q1, Q2). The scientific novelty of the research lies in the culturological approach to the analysis of (...) threats to the security of Russian citizens associated with the use of ChatGPT as one of the technologies of "artificial intelligence". The formulation of the problem of the classical Turing test "to distinguish a person from a machine" is characterized as a scholastic abstraction, instead a more correct and productive approach is proposed: a socio-cultural assessment of the value (based on cultural axiology) of new computer technologies. The starting point of the analysis is the determination of socio-cultural value (or, conversely, damage) as a result of the use of generative language models based on machine learning. Further, the contribution and responsibility of various socio-cultural subjects of its creation and application are revealed − user, creator and developer. The result of the application of the proposed approach is the deconstruction of the discourse of the "philosophy of artificial intelligence" in terms of uncritical translation of developer declarations intended for marketing and attracting financing. Hypertrophied perception, precariously balancing on the edge of utopia and dystopia, is assessed as a risk of incorrect identification and ranking of threats to information security. Assumptions about the hypothetical "superweapon of psychological warfare" mask modern incidents of cross-border leakage of confidential data, the risks of being held accountable for publishing deliberately false information and illegal content as a result of using ChatGPT. National security measures are recommended, including restrictive measures and increasing the general civil culture of information security of users, as well as the orientation of domestic developments of solutions of this type on traditional values, socio-cultural identity and interests of Russian citizens. (shrink)

I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal binding. 2, (...) Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)

“Eco-labels” are an increasingly important form of private regulation for sustainability in areas such as carbon emissions, water consumption, ethical sourcing, or organic produce. The growing interest and popularity of eco-labels has also been coupled with growing concerns about their credibility, in part because the standard-setting and conformity assessment practices that eco-labels adopt exhibit striking differences. In this paper, we assess which assurance practices contribute to eco-labels being perceived as better governed, in the eyes of experts as well as the (...) media. Unlike previous studies, which are mostly conceptual, qualitative, or focused on one or few eco-labels, we study a large set of eco-labels, combining data from three different sources. Our findings suggest that experts and media are primarily concerned about “re-assurance” practices, looking for one or preferably multiple layers of “re-assurance” that independent parties are overseeing the eco-label and the firms certified under it. (shrink)